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Executive Summary 
 
 
Ontario's private sector has had zero productivity growth in the latest six year period.  
Ontario performed much worse than the rest of Canada or the United States.  This is 
obviously a cause for concern.    Productivity is an important measure of progress in the 
economy, as it is associated with rising standards of living in the long run. 
 
The question is whether this observation about productivity is significant in its own right,   
or if it is more a symptom of the overall state of the economy.   The Ontario economy has 
been hit by major external shocks, resulting in plunging exports and a declining private 
sector employment rate.   Is productivity an independent causal factor, or merely the 
residual outcome of weak demand? 
 
This paper examines the issue through detailed sectoral data.   It examines the diversity of 
productivity performance in about 50 industrial sectors.   The picture that emerges is that 
the overall productivity growth rate is not really representative.  It is the random outcome 
of a wide range of underlying variation.  There are some important sectors (e.g., retail 
trade and finance) that have maintained decent productivity growth.  There are some 
sectors, especially in manufacturing, where the level of productivity is currently far 
below its previous level.  This is not merely weak growth, but decline.  In some industries 
(e.g., steel), some of the largest players have shut down, essentially changing the 
character of that sector even though the name remains the same. 
 
Overall, the implication is that the weakness of productivity is caused by weak aggregate 
demand.  Historically, productivity growth has been pro-cyclical, being positively 
correlated with demand growth.  Strong demand creates economies of scale and 
distributes overhead costs over a larger base.   The weakness of demand in recent years 
has also been associated with compositional shifts in the economy.   Employment and 
output have plunged in manufacturing (whose level of productivity is above the 
economy-wide average), while it has grown in some service sectors with below average 
productivity.  Such compositional shifts would reduce the average productivity of the 
economy even if there was no change in the productivity of any individual sectors. 
 
Ontario had positive productivity growth in the service sector, but underperformed the 
strong growth found in the rest of Canada.  Here, too, the explanation is likely found in 
diseconomies of scale due to weaker demand.  For example, the higher productivity 
growth in retail and wholesale trade in the rest of Canada was associated with growth in 
sales that was two-thirds higher than in Ontario over the past six years. 
 
The weakness of demand in Ontario is largely due to falling exports, caused by the high 
Canadian dollar and the weak US economy.    This can be considered in a positive light.  
While a strong rebound in exports does not appear to be around the corner, the worst is 
probably behind us.  There should be a continuing gradual improvement in exports in the 
coming years, leading to some increase in productivity growth.  The Ontario government 
should focus its policy levers, which are admittedly constrained, on helping to further the 
upward trend in exports. 
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A Sectoral Analysis of Ontario's Weak Productivity Growth 
 
 One of the most widely discussed economic performance indicators in recent 
years has been labour productivity, which is real GDP per hour worked.  This is 
considered to be an important indicator.   It has been observed that, in the long run, 
increases in real wage rates and standards of living tend to depend on it.1  
 
 Ontario's performance in terms of labour productivity has been very poor over the 
past several years.  This has caused a considerable amount of anxiety.  Part of the reason 
for the anxiety is a lack of understanding of what these numbers mean.   There is a 
widespread misconception among non-economists that productivity is something that 
exists as a common factor throughout the economy.  Therefore, these people tend to 
attach a kind of moral significance to the lack of productivity growth, as a collective 
failing of the business leaders, policymakers, and/or workers of Ontario. 
 
 This paper will suggest that productivity is a series of very heterogeneous residual 
outcomes that depends on a wide variety of factors.  From that point of view, productivity 
is not an independent causal factor that determines standards of living.  It is a coincident 
indicator, rather than a leading indicator.   While there are many reasons for anxiety 
about the Ontario economy, the excessive focus on productivity, as if it was a driving 
factor, is misplaced. 
 
 There is both a demand side and a supply side to productivity.   There is a greater 
potential for output to grow per hour worked as workers become more educated, and they 
have more and better capital equipment to work with.  However, this potential will not be 
realized if there is insufficient demand.   If highly educated individuals are relegated to 
flipping hamburgers or selling shirts, their potential will not be realized.  If more output 
cannot be sold, it will not make sense for companies to invest in more and better 
equipment to increase output. 
 
 Business commentators generally focus on the single average productivity rate for 
the whole economy.  If most of the economy was clustered close to this average, it would 
be a meaningful indicator.  In fact, this average provides very little insight, inasmuch as it 
is the random product of a huge range of different sub-components.  In order to 
understand productivity, it is necessary to see what lies beneath, and look at its 
performance at the detailed sectoral level.  The possibility of doing this has been 
facilitated by a new experimental database from Statistics Canada that provides detailed 
sectoral productivity by province.2  As we peel away the layers, it will be possible to 
better understand why productivity has slowed so sharply in Ontario. 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted, however, that there is no fixed relationship between productivity and real wage rates.  
This would only occur if the economy was characterized by a simple Cobb-Douglas type production 
function, and most empirical evidence does not support it.   Changes in the relative prices of imports and 
exports can also play a significant role in the standard of living, and that is the main reason why Alberta has 
been doing so well.   The important role of the terms of trade was recently emphasized by W. Erwin 
Diewert and Emily Yu, "New Estimates of Real Income and Multifactor Productivity Growth for the 
Canadian Business Sector," International Productivity Monitor, Fall 2012. 
2
 The author is indebted to Hugh Finnigan for providing the data, and to earlier analysis of it in papers by 
Qaizar Hussain and Hugh Finnigan.  
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A Brief Historical Overview 
 
 Ontario has diverged very sharply from the performance of the rest of Canada 
(henceforth, ROC, which is the total for Canada minus Ontario) over the past ten years, 
both in productivity growth and in a host of other indicators such as employment growth 
and investment growth.  This is related to the fact that Ontario's economy was the most 
open to international trade in general, and dependent in particular on exports of finished 
goods and services rather than raw commodities.  It was therefore the most susceptible to 
both the sharp upward valuation of the Canadian dollar that began in 2003, and the deep 
recession among developed countries (and in particular the United States) that began in 
2008.    
 
 Ontario had much more to lose than the rest of Canada, starting with a greater 
dependence on exports.  The early 2000s were already weak because of the dot-com 
recession in the United States.  Between 2002 and 2008, Ontario's international exports as 
a share of GDP fell by nearly 10 percentage points, compared to hardly any decline in the 
rest of Canada, where the rising dollar's effect was largely offset by rising international 
commodity prices.  The recession took it down another 5 percentage points or so, but it 
bottomed in 2009 and there has been a modest recovery since then (Figure 3). 
 
 The loss in export sales fed through to weak overall demand and lost jobs.  Export 
industries tend to have higher productivity than the average, and the loss of jobs there 
forced workers to take jobs in much less productive sectors. 
 
 Table 1 summarizes overall private sector productivity growth over several time 
periods for Ontario compared to the rest of Canada, and for the service sectors and 
manufacturing sectors.3 
 
Table 1.  Average annual percent change in real GDP per hour worked 
 
 1985 to 2000 2001 to 2005 2006 to 2011 
Ontario business sector 1.3 0.8 0.0 
Ontario service sector 1.2 1.6 0.5 
Ontario manufacturing 2.6 0.1 0.1 
ROC business sector 1.2 1.4 0.9 
ROC service sector 1.2 2.1 1.2 
ROC manufacturing 2.4 1.6 2.0 
 
 It can be seen that, prior to 2000, Ontario's performance was quite similar to that 
of the ROC.   Ontario's business sector enjoyed moderate productivity growth, averaging 
1.3 percent per year from 1985 to 2000.   
 
 In the latest six year period of data, from 2006 to 2011, Ontario's overall business 
sector productivity growth was zero.   While the ROC showed some weakness related to 
the recession, it was only modestly lower than its long-run historical average.  When 
                                                 
3
 The comparisons in this paper are mainly between Ontario and the ROC.  There are serious statistical 
problems in comparing productivity in different countries, as noted in the recent paper by Diewert and Yu 
(note 1).   
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people speak about "Canada's abysmal productivity growth," which is a commonly seen 
phrase in business commentaries, they are talking (whether they know it or not) mainly 
about Ontario.4 
 
 It will be observed in the first column of Table 1 that manufacturing productivity 
growth was quite a bit stronger than service sector productivity growth in the 1985 to 
2000 period.   The 2.6 percent growth in manufacturing productivity combined with the 
1.2 percent growth in service sector productivity produced an overall growth rate of only 
1.3 percent.   The overall growth was influenced by a rising share of service output in the 
economy.  The service sector increased its share of total business sector output by 6 
percentage points over this period.  Not only did the service sector have lower annual 
productivity growth than manufacturing, but its level of output per hour worked was 
lower, bringing down the overall average as it increased its share of the economy.   This 
is one example of how the composition of the economy can influence the overall average 
productivity growth rate. 
 
 Similarly, in the 2006 to 2011 period, overall business sector productivity growth 
was zero, in spite of non-zero growth in service sector productivity.   The whole was less 
than the sum of its parts.  This too is a function of the changing composition of output, as 
sectors with below-average levels of productivity increased their share of the total.  The 
next section will discuss the issue of the effect of the distribution of output in more detail. 
 
Figure 1 
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4
 Ontario's disproportionate contribution to the national decline has been noted by Andrew Sharpe and Eric 
Thomson.  They coined the widely-quoted phrase, in "Insights into Canada’s Abysmal Post-2000 
Productivity Performance from Decompositions of Labour Productivity Growth by Industry and Province," 
International Productivity Monitor, Fall 2010.  Their analysis covered the period up to 2007, and their 
conclusions were quite similar to those of this paper. 
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How the Composition of Output Affects Overall Productivity 
 
 The level of output per hour worked varies greatly across the different sectors of 
the economy.   This reflects the earnings of both the physical and human capital of the 
sector.   Some sectors have a very high GDP per worker because there is a lot of very 
expensive capital investment that has to earn a rate of return there.  Some sectors have a 
higher GDP reflecting the high educational levels and incomes of their workers.  Some 
sectors (such as mining and manufacturing) have a high GDP per hour worked because of 
the high return on the capital used, in spite of the relatively low human capital of their 
employees.5   In some sectors, such as food services, there are relatively low levels of 
both educational requirement (although, anecdotally, many servers have post-secondary 
education) and physical capital, leading to a low level of value added per hour worked. 
 
 Figure 2 graphs the variation at the two digit level of fairly aggregated industries, 
and even here there is a very large range, from GDP of $120 per hour worked in utilities 
to less than $16 per hour in accommodation and food services.6  In 2011 Ontario had 
446,000 workers in the latter sector, but only 46,000 in the utilities sector. 
 
 If we drill down further, we find even larger variations.  At the three digit level 
within the utilities sector, we find pipelines with GDP of about $1000 per hour worked.  
In the finance and leasing sector we find an average GDP of $81.  However, if we go 
down to the four digit level within that sector, we find a range from $46 in real estate 
services to $295 in lessors of real estate (the companies that actually own the properties 
and earn the rent on them).   These are very high levels of average productivity, but the 
marginal productivity from adding additional workers would be much lower than the 
average productivity.  Likewise, the capital itself only has a high productivity if there is a 
use for it.  Pipelines are very expensive, so if the pipeline earns its expected rate of return, 
the output per hour worked needed to maintain it will be very high.  However, there 
would be no value in building a pipeline if there was no demand for its services, as it 
would earn a very low rate of return, and the marginal productivity would be far lower 
than average productivity of the existing pipelines. 
 
                                                 
5
 The average pay in manufacturing is only $5 per hour higher than in services, but the output per hour gap 
is about $17, reflecting the higher level of capital/labour in manufacturing. 
6
 "PST" stands for professional, scientific, and technical and services.  With a name like that, one would 
expect it to have fairly high income levels.  In fact, it is a grab-bag of miscellaneous categories, with over 
500,000 jobs, ranging all the way from lawyers to bookkeeping and market research services, and is 
weighted down by a large number of lower paid occupations in the latter categories. 
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Figure 2 
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 In manufacturing, the average was $53 in 2011, but at the four digit level we find 
a range from $22 per hour in agricultural chemicals to $133 in automobile assembly.   
What is even more peculiar is that a few years ago the level for agricultural chemicals 
was over $80 per hour, and for auto assembly it was over $170 per hour. 
 
 Even the four digit level is highly aggregated, and obscures the considerable 
differences that can exist between one company and another.  Different companies that 
fall into a category can be vastly different in what they produce and how they do it.  Their 
productivity will fall if they are operating at below capacity because of weak demand, 
and have to keep on managerial and security employees even when the plant is idle.     
 
A Hypothetical example:   Assume an economy that consists of just two sectors, food 
services and manufacturing.  Output per hour worked is $16 in food services, and $50 in 
manufacturing.  As the number of hours worked in manufacturing declines due to lower 
exports, aggregate productivity (output per hour worked) declines in the economy. 
 
 In this example, a large decline in aggregate measured productivity occurs, even 
though there has been no actual change in productivity at the plant level. 
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Table 2.  A simple numerical example showing how a change in the composition of 
output can affect average measured productivity 
 Hours 
worked in 
food 
services 
Hours worked 
in 
manufacturing 
Total hours 
worked  
Total GDP Average 
productivity in 
the economy  
(output per 
hour worked) 
2005 1,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 $66,000,000 $33 
2006 1,000,000 800,000 1,800,000 $56,000,000 $31.1 
2007 1,000,000 600,000 1,600,000 $46,000,000 $28.8 
 
 
The Effect of Export Demand on Composition of Output 
 
 Ontario's exporting industries are among the ones that have the highest output per 
hour, such as auto manufacturing, with output per hour of well over $100.  By contrast, 
local service producing firms and manufacturers that serve the domestic market tend to 
have lower productivity.  The decline in exports has reduced the output of some of the 
higher productivity sectors in the Ontario economy.   Therefore, it would have a negative 
impact on average productivity, for the reasons just discussed, even if there was no 
impact on productivity within any individual company.    
Figure 3 
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 In reality, even productivity at the plant level is often adversely affected, as some 
of the remaining operations would be operating at a smaller scale, spreading overhead 
costs over a smaller amount of production.    
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 Many large operations with high absolute levels of GDP per hour worked (such as 
major steel mills at the former Stelco) have been shut down, not being able to compete 
due to the sudden appreciation of the Canadian dollar.    This leaves a larger share of 
what is classed as manufacturing in less efficient firms that serve local markets, such as 
small firms processing scrap metal.  Other examples include small-scale specialty food 
manufacturing and custom furniture makers.    
 
 It may seem paradoxical that more productive operations fail, while less 
productive ones remain, but there is considerable segmentation in markets, as some types 
of activities have a substantial service or perishable component, and have an advantage in 
being closer to markets.   Their price elasticity of demand is relatively low.  Other 
products which are very generic have to compete in global markets purely on price, and 
their price elasticity of demand is very high. 
 
 The tendency towards smaller scale operations over the past several years is 
evident in the data on Ontario employment by class and size of establishment.  The 
employment changes in the Ontario economy over the past several years have been in the 
direction of smaller scale and less efficiency: 
 
Table 3.  Recent Ontario employment changes by type of 
employment 
Thousands of jobs 
Class of worker  2007 2011 
Percent 
change 
Total private sector employment 5365 5388 0.4 
Total employees, firms with 500+ employees 547 472 -13.7 
Self-employed with employees 317 309 -2.6 
Self-employed without employees 653 719 10.1 
 
 The average annual GDP per person from unincorporated businesses is less than 
half of the business sector average.  If the new participants in that sector since 2007 could 
instead have been employed at the economy-wide average, that by itself would have 
boosted real GDP by about half a percent.  That is just the tip of the iceberg, as they 
happen to fall into a class of workers for which we have specific data.  Overall, there has 
been a general shift throughout the economy towards firms of smaller size and less 
efficient scale. 
 
 A very detailed study of plant-level productivity by Statistics Canada looked 
specifically at manufacturing in the period from 2000 to 2006.  They found that the 
higher dollar led to a shift away from export orientation, with a resultant weakening of 
productivity growth:   "Export-market participants gain more in productivity growth from 
currency depreciation than non-participants... the dramatic increase in the value of the 
Canadian dollar during the post-2000 period almost completely offset the advantages 
enjoyed by export-market participants. Our counterfactual exercise shows that 
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fluctuations in real exchange rates explain almost all the shifts in productivity growth 
gaps between export-market participants and nonparticipants in this latter period."7 
Figure 4 
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 Between 2003 and 2011, total employment in manufacturing in Ontario fell by 
almost 30 percent, but the decline was greatest in the firms with the most employees, and 
hence the firms that would be expected to have the greatest economies of scale.   The 
following table shows the percentage of manufacturing employees by size class: 
 
Table 4.  Percentage of Ontario 
manufacturing employees in firms of 
different size classes 
 
Fewer than 
100 
employees 100 to 500  
More than 
500 
2003 40.5 37.2 22.3
2004 40.2 38.6 21.2
2005 41.4 38.2 20.4
2006 42.7 35.5 21.8
2007 42.5 35.7 21.8
2008 44.4 35.6 20.1
2009 49.0 33.8 17.2
2010 47.1 35.0 17.8
2011 46.9 34.5 18.6
                                                 
7
 "Export Market Dynamics and Plant-level Productivity:  Impact of Tariff Reductions and Exchange Rate 
Cycles," by John Baldwin and Beiling Yan, Economic Analysis Research Paper Series, Statistics Canada, 
2010. 
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In Ontario, fewer than 20 percent of manufacturing workers are in firms with more than 
500 employees.   By comparison, about 50 percent work for firms of that size in the US. 
 
 The decline in manufacturing productivity growth was particularly large, from 
average annual growth of 2.6 percent per year prior to 2000, to near-zero after that.  It 
appears that this can be fully explained by the decline in demand for Ontario’s 
manufacturing output.  It is possible to estimate the correlation between manufacturing 
productivity growth and output growth over the historical period with regression analysis, 
as described in Appendix 1.   As discussed there, the relationship is quite stable, finding 
nearly identical coefficients in periods of output growth and output decline.  This 
suggests that productivity growth in manufacturing rises about 0.64 percent with each 1 
percent increase in output growth. 
 
 This coefficient is applied in Table 5, to calculate how much higher Ontario's 
manufacturing productivity growth might have been with higher output, matching that of 
the US or ROC.8   Interestingly, the result is that Ontario would have closely matched 
productivity growth in those other jurisdictions.   The implication is that Ontario's weak 
manufacturing productivity growth is fully explained by its weak output growth.  That, in 
turn, is substantially explained by the high Canadian dollar.  The other provinces 
managed to largely avoid the worst impacts of this.  They export less of their 
manufactured products, and more of what they produce is of a specialized nature related 
to their resource industries.  However, further detailed analysis would need to be 
undertaken to test whether this fully explains the much smaller drop in manufacturing 
production in the other provinces. 
 
  
Table 5.   Counterfactuals:  How much would Ontario's manufacturing productivity 
growth have increased if Ontario's output growth had matched that of the ROC or 
the US? 
 Manufacturing output, 
annual % change 
Manufacturing productivity, annual % 
change 
ROC, 2005 to 2011 actual -0.3 2.2 
US, 2005 to 2011 actual 0.6 3.3 
Ontario, 2005 to 2011 actual -3.4 0.6 
If Ontario had matched ROC 
output growth 
add 3.1 onto Ontario's 
output to raise it to -0.3 
0.6 + 0.64*3.1=2.6 
If Ontario had matched US 
output growth  
add 4 onto Ontario's 
output to raise it to 0.6 
0.6 + 0.64*4=3.2 
 
 The next section will seek to confirm these macroeconomic estimates by looking 
at how changes in the micro structure of production contributed to changes at the 
aggregate level.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Table 5 covers the rates of change from 2005 to 2011, as data on US manufacturing value added are not 
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis prior to that.   
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Why Has Service Sector Productivity Growth Underperformed? 
 
The most dramatic weakness for Ontario’s productivity growth in the past decade 
occurred in manufacturing.   However, as seen in Table 1 above, Ontario also 
underperformed compared to the rest of Canada in service sector productivity growth, 
which was positive but weak in Ontario.  Table 6 looks at the details behind this for the 
latest six year period. 
 
The most important service sector category for Ontario is financial services, 
representing 29 percent of services output.   Here, Ontario’s productivity growth slightly 
outperformed the ROC average. 
 
The next most important components are wholesale and retail trade, which 
together comprise 24 percent of service sector output.  Here, Ontario’s productivity 
growth was reasonably good, but substantially lower than the very strong ROC average 
growth.   There does not appear to be much of a difference in trend between Ontario and 
the rest of Canada in this sector.  The relative levels of productivity were not materially 
different in 2011 than they were ten or fifteen years earlier, in spite of the recent stronger 
growth in the rest of Canada.  The differences in the recent growth rates likely reflect the 
weaker income growth and resulting weaker sales growth in Ontario rather than any 
fundamental differences.   Over this period, the growth rate of combined nominal retail 
and wholesale sales in ROC was 66% larger than in Ontario. As well, one of the activities 
that people who become self-employed do is small scale, low productivity retailing, and 
self-employment was the largest area of employment growth in Ontario in this period.9   
(A quantitative analysis of the relationship between productivity and sales growth can be 
found in Appendix 3.)  
 
There are a number of sectors that suffered negative productivity change.  The 
most significant of these was the professional, scientific and technical service area.  In 
spite of its grand name, it is a large sector with over 500,000 jobs that includes some low 
paying occupations such as bookkeeping services.10   A surplus of workers willing to take 
low paying jobs may have boosted employment in the lower productivity segments of 
this classification.   As will be discussed in the next section, absolute declines in 
productivity in particular sectors probably indicate a change in composition.  This is often 
the result of weak demand for the higher productivity activities, that forces people to 
move into lower productivity ones for the lack of any better alternative.   
                                                 
9
 Over the period covered by Table 6, self-employed people with no employees increased 17.4 percent in 
Ontario, compared to only 7.8 percent in the ROC.  Sadly, this was Ontario’s only “booming” sector. 
10
 Based on the difference between total employment and SEPH employment, it can be inferred that about 
37 percent of the workers in that sector were self-employed in 2011, which is up about 5 percentage points 
since 2007.  This is consistent with the view that people who cannot get paid jobs crowd into fields where 
they have self-employment opportunities, but they often have poor earnings, dragging down the average 
productivity of the sector. 
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Table 6.  Detailed comparison of Ontario versus ROC productivity growth in 
services, 2006 to 2011 
NAICS 
code 
 This code’s % 
share of 
Ontario 
services GDP 
in 2011 
Ontario annual 
% change in 
productivity, 
2006 to 2011  
ROC annual 
% change in 
productivity, 
2006 to 2011  
410 Wholesale Trade 12.4 1.7 3.1 
4A0 Retail Trade 11.7 1.5 2.8 
484 Truck Transportation 2.3 -0.9 3.1 
485 Transit and Ground Passenger 
Transportation 1.0 1.0 0.7 
486 Pipeline Transportation 0.3 3.7 2.2 
48A Other Transportation 2.8 2.4 2.0 
493 Warehousing and Storage 0.3 -2.3 -0.7 
49A Postal Service and Couriers and 
Messengers 1.2 -1.0 1.3 
512 Motion picture and sound recording 
industries  0.5 x -0.5* 
51B Publishing, broadcasting, 
telecommunications and other 
information services 
6.9 x 0.0* 
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 11.3 -1.3 0.1 
561 Administrative and Support Services 4.9 -1.0 0.1 
562 Waste Management and Remediation 
Services 0.7 -0.5 0.5 
5A0 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Rental and Leasing (excluding owner 
occupied dwellings) 
29.3 1.7 1.3 
610 Educational Services 0.5 1.0 -1.3 
620 Health Care and Social Assistance 5.4 -0.6 -0.8 
710 Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 1.5 -1.3 -1.4 
720 Accommodation and Food Services 3.9 1.5 -0.1 
811 Repair and Maintenance 1.2 -1.3 1.2 
813 Civic and professional organizations 0.5 -2.0 -0.4 
81A Personal, household  and laundry 
services 1.5 -1.9 -0.4 
X = unavailable due to confidentiality;  * denotes value for all of Canada, as ROC cannot be 
calculated 
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Three Digit NAICS Sectoral Decomposition of the Weakness in Ontario's 
Productivity 
 
 This section will look at the variations in the economy using the three digit 
NAICS code level, which breaks out about 50 private sector industries.11   The purpose is 
to estimate the total impact of detailed compositional change and related factors in 
dragging down the average productivity figure for Ontario. 
 
 Two types of counterfactual analysis will be undertaken here.   The first will be to 
look at how productivity would have differed if the growth in hours of employment in all 
sectors had been the same.   In particular, employment in manufacturing dropped sharply, 
and its average productivity is higher than the economy-wide average.  Some of the 
strongest growth areas in employment were in parts of the service sector that have 
relatively low productivity.   The analysis will relate to the change in employment from 
2006 to 2011, which was noted in Table 1 as being a period when Ontario had zero 
overall productivity growth.   
  
 Figure 5 highlights the wide variation.  It shows the change in hours worked in 
terms of absolute numbers, rather than percentage change, as it is the absolute number 
that determines its weight in the impact on the overall productivity outcome.   For 
example, mining is a relatively high productivity industry that had a strong percentage 
increase in hours worked.  However, it started from a small base, and a large percentage 
change represents a relatively small number of jobs and a small amount of GDP.  
Therefore, it only had a small impact on the overall outcome.  Figure 5 shows the 
variation for the 2 digit NAICS categories.  There are too many sectors at the three digit 
level to easily fit into a chart, but the actual analysis will be carried out at the three digit 
level.  At the three digit level, the outcome is worsened by the fact that the largest loss in 
hours in manufacturing was in auto assembly, which is also the sub-sector of 
manufacturing with the highest level of productivity.   
                                                 
11
 In principle, there are 51 categories at the three digit level of the Productivity Accounts.  However, at this 
level, four of them are suppressed by Statistics Canada for Ontario to protect confidentiality, leaving 47 for 
the analysis. 
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Figure 5 
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 The results of two types of recalculation are depicted in Table 8 below.   The first 
one rebalances the hours worked to calculate the level of GDP that would have existed in 
2011 if all sectors had hours growing at the same rate.    
 
 The second recalculation makes a more radical alteration.  It recognizes the 
problem alluded to above, that even at the disaggregation that is provided at the three 
digit level,12 much of the change in composition is hidden.   One of the startling features 
of the sectoral productivity data, already alluded to above, is that for some sectors the 
level of productivity in 2011 is well below the peak.   The low average productivity 
growth that occurred was not the result of all industries growing together at the same 
weak rate.  It is the average of some sectors that had continuing positive productivity 
growth, and some others that had large declines not just in growth rate but in level.  
Sectors with substantial absolute declines in productivity are especially prevalent in 
manufacturing, as seen in Table 7.   Out of 20 three-digit NAICS categories in 
manufacturing, all but two were below their previous peak level of productivity in 
                                                 
12
 The experimental Productivity Accounts also include a four digit NAICS level.  That provides a 
theoretical 95 categories, but 11 of them are suppressed due to confidentiality.  This makes analysis at that 
level problematic, as a larger proportion of the economy is missing. 
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2011.13  In some cases they were far below their peaks, no doubt indicating that some 
major facilities that had high levels of productivity have been completely shut down.14 
 
If weak productivity growth is meaningful as a concept, it must refer to sectors 
that are not investing enough, or are not innovative enough.  These factors would reduce 
the growth rate, but they would not ordinarily cause a drop in the level far below what 
had been previously reached.15  Mere lack of ambition or effort as the causal factors 
would imply a rate of zero as the floor for productivity growth in each sector.   Therefore, 
if some sectors are showing large drops, it is likely because there are unfortunate 
compositional changes going on within those sectors that we cannot discern from the 
data, e.g., large companies that formerly competed in the export market, and had  
economies of scale, have gone out of business, and left a residue of smaller firms serving 
the domestic market because of some particular service niche that allows them to survive 
in spite of small scale and inefficiency from a global perspective.    
 
Figure 6 
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13
 It is true that in the process of Schumpeterian "creative destruction," some sectors will be undergoing 
decline even in good economic times.  However, 2011 was clearly atypical.  Only two out of 20 sectors 
were not below their previous peak, with an average ratio of 0.85 (2011 productivity level divided by the 
previous peak level).  By comparison, in 1999 it was eight out of 20, with an average ratio of 0.92. 
14
 I have omitted petroleum and coal products (code 324) from the table, pending verification of a data 
anomaly.  Its productivity in 2011 displays a remarkable 66 percent decline from its peak.  There was one 
major refinery closure in 2005, but this does not appear to be sufficient to explain such a large decline. 
15
 One could think of some extreme examples where productivity would drop due to a lack of investment.  
For example, this might happen if a company hired more workers without adding more capital, and forced 
the existing workers to share their equipment with the new workers.  Such behaviour is likely to be rare, 
particularly in manufacturing, where there has been a large decline in total employment. 
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Table 7.  Manufacturing Productivity levels in 2011 compared to the peak in the 
previous decade 
NAICS 
code Name 
Level of productivity in 2011 
relative to previous peak (percent 
difference) 
311 Food Manufacturing 
-3.1 
312 
Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing 
-25.4 
31A Textile and Textile Product Mills 
-15.1 
315 Clothing Manufacturing 
-22.1 
316 
Leather and Allied Product 
Manufacturing 
-4.6 
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 
-9.1 
322 Paper Manufacturing 
-6.1 
323 
Printing and Related Support 
Activities 
-18.2 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 
-22.1 
326 
Plastics and Rubber Products 
Manufacturing 0.0 
327 
Non-Metallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing 
-7.0 
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing -12.7 
332 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Manufacturing 
-8.4 
333 Machinery Manufacturing -0.6 
334 
Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing 0.0 
335 
Electrical Equipment, Appliance and 
Component Manufacturing 
-25.6 
336 
Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing 
-9.9 
337 
Furniture and Related Product 
Manufacturing 
-23.1 
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing -10.6 
 
 
 The sectors that are showing absolute declines in the level of productivity can be 
regarded as noise in the data.    In some instances, the composition of plants within the 
sector may have changed so much that in essence it has become a different sector than it 
was before.  The second recalculation in Table 8 takes this view into account.   It shows 
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what the level of GDP in Ontario would have been in 2011 if the sectors for which 
declining productivity is found in the data had instead stayed at the previous highest level 
that they attained before the decline.   When both of these calculations are combined, the 
result is that the level would be 11.2 percent higher than the actual.  The zero productivity 
change actually recorded in the 2006 to 2011 period would instead have been 1.8 percent 
per year.   This is higher than the historical average, but not out of the range of variation 
for a period of six years.16   What this highlights is that there were some sectors in which 
companies were making considerable efforts, in the face of adversity, to achieve 
productivity growth.   
 
Table 8.  Alternative scenarios of Ontario private sector productivity 
growth, based on reversing adverse changes at the three digit NAICS level 
 GDP in 2011,  
$billions  
(2002 constant 
dollars) 
Implied annual 
average % 
productivity 
growth, 2006 
to 2011 
Actual private sector GDP in 2011  347.1 0.0 
Hypothetical GDP if all sectors had the same 
percentage change in hours worked from 2006 to 
2011 (total hours remaining the same for the whole 
economy) 
359.6 0.6 
Hypothetical GDP if no sector had suffered a 
decline in 2011 relative to its previous maximum 
absolute level of productivity 
371.7 1.1 
Combined effect of both of the above adjustments 386.0 1.8 
 
 
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
 
 The analysis in this paper has found that the productivity behaviour of the sub-
sectors of the Ontario economy is very diverse.  There is not a low rate of productivity 
growth that is found throughout the Ontario economy, like a pervasive miasma of 
mediocrity.   
 
 The aggregate productivity growth rate for Ontario’s private sector happened to 
average zero in the past six years.   That does not mean that all parts of the Ontario 
economy had approximately zero productivity growth.  A few have had quite strong 
growth, while others have suffered not weak growth, but absolute declines in the level of 
productivity. 
 
 By and large, it is possible to explain the overall weak productivity with reference 
to weak demand growth.  Weak demand for Ontario’s production has resulted in various 
adverse effects on productivity.  It leads to lower capacity utilization, and overhead 
expenses being spread over a smaller base.  It leads people who have lost jobs in higher 
productivity sectors to try to shift into whatever jobs they can get, and these are often at 
lower productivity levels.   Many of the higher productivity sectors in Ontario have been 
dependent on exports, and exports have been very hard hit by external shocks.   
                                                 
16
 E.g., the average productivity growth for the six years ending in 2002 was 2.6 percent. 
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 The situation has been particularly acute in manufacturing, where 18 out of 20 
sub-sectors are at a lower level than their previous peak, in some cases much lower.  It is 
ironic that many analysts call for increased productivity as a way to increase Ontario’s 
competitiveness.  The causality tends to run the other way.  It is the lack of 
competitiveness of some major facilities, that previously had high productivity levels (as 
measured by GDP per hour worked), that has caused them to be shut down, and reduced 
the average level of productivity in the economy.    
 
 If weak productivity is the result of weak exports, that is not something that can 
be easily or quickly remedied by provincial government policies.   On the plus side, it is 
likely that the worst is behind us and there will be a gradual improvement in the coming 
years.   Indeed, exports have bottomed out and have already turned up as a share of GDP.  
There is some hope for stronger growth in the US in the coming years, boosting exports 
further.  It is hard to predict what will happen to the Canadian dollar.  While a high dollar 
will likely continue, it is something that the economy gradually adjusts to, partly through 
downward adjustments to wage rates that can eventually (albeit slowly and painfully) 
restore competitiveness.   
 
 One thing that emerges is the importance of ensuring that the current obstacles to 
exporting from Ontario are minimized, and if possible reversed.  The Ontario government 
should continue to try to influence the federal government’s position on the exchange rate 
and on international trade treaties.  It is possible that some tax levers could be used to 
provide greater benefits to exporting industries.17 It is likely that infrastructure and border 
issues have had a negative impact on Ontario’s exports over the past several years.  Some 
remedial action has been taken on that, but some aspects of it (such as the new bridge and 
road infrastructure at Windsor) will not be available for many years. 
 
 Further research is needed to understand why Ontario’s exports and 
manufacturing production have suffered so much more than that of the ROC or the 
United States.  The exchange rate is no doubt the largest part of the story, but without 
further analysis, we cannot be certain that it explains all of it.   It is important to 
understand what might be different in terms of structure and the regulatory environment 
in Ontario as compared to the rest of North America that might have worsened Ontario's 
performance.  If it is found that Ontario has its own peculiar adverse institutional factors, 
it may be possible to fix those and achieve a more favourable outcome.  
 
 Capital investment has not been discussed in this paper, and it is clearly also an 
important factor that can affect productivity growth.  Business leaders, when criticized by 
the Bank of Canada governor for sitting on cash rather than investing, pointed out that 
they have little incentive to invest in a risky environment when they also have excess 
capacity.  It would be useful to investigate how well investment at the detailed sector 
level correlates with such factors, and what the prospects are for improvement of 
investment in key sectors as the economic recovery continues. 
 
                                                 
17
 The prevailing philosophy in taxation in recent years has been a “level playing field” view that does not 
favour one sector over another.  However, this approach is not supported by economic theory, which 
implies that lower tax rates should apply to sectors that face a higher price elasticity of demand.   
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Appendix 1:   Regression analysis looking at the relationship between output growth 
and productivity growth in manufacturing. 
 
The dependent variable DLP is the year-to-year percent change in real value added per 
hour worked, and the explanatory variable is the percent change in value added.   A 
pooled cross-section regression was done using data for all 20 three digit sub-sectors of 
manufacturing.   
 
In the regressions shown below, the sample is split into two parts.  The first regression 
covers the period from 1985 to 1999, and the second one from 2000 to 2011.  The former 
corresponds to a period of strong positive output growth, while the latter consists mainly 
of a period of falling output in manufacturing.  In spite of the marked difference in the 
periods, the coefficient on the output variable is virtually identical.  This allows us to 
have considerable confidence that there is a stable structural relationship between 
productivity growth and output growth. 
 
This does not address the question of causality.   Did weak output growth in the post-
2000 period cause the weak productivity growth?  Or was there some exogenous negative 
shock to Ontario’s technology or work attitudes that caused weak productivity growth, 
which in turn made Ontario companies unable to compete, and led to reduced 
productivity growth?   The crude nature of the data does not allow us to address the issue 
through the usual econometric methods of causality testing.   However, this is a situation 
where extrinsic knowledge provides a ready answer.  There were two obvious and very 
large negative demand shocks in the post-2000 period:  a more than 60 percent 
appreciation in the value of the Canadian dollar, and the worst recession in the 
industrialized world since the 1930s.  (See Appendix 2.)  In this context, any special 
factors originating in Ontario that might have independently reduced productivity growth 
must be very minor by comparison. 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DLP   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 12/26/12   Time: 16:28  
Sample: 1985 1999   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 20  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.067673 0.588254 1.814987 0.0705 
DIFQA 0.675747 0.065985 10.24090 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.260318     Mean dependent var 2.255729 
Adjusted R-squared 0.257836     S.D. dependent var 11.59475 
S.E. of regression 9.988753     Akaike info criterion 7.447441 
Sum squared resid 29733.01     Schwarz criterion 7.472133 
Log likelihood -1115.116     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.457323 
F-statistic 104.8761     Durbin-Watson stat 2.435739 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: DLP   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 12/26/12   Time: 16:29  
Sample: 2000 2011   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 20  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 240 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.050007 0.492711 4.160666 0.0000 
DIFQA 0.641056 0.043392 14.77351 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.478364     Mean dependent var 0.968702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.476172     S.D. dependent var 10.42937 
S.E. of regression 7.548360     Akaike info criterion 6.888836 
Sum squared resid 13560.70     Schwarz criterion 6.917841 
Log likelihood -824.6603     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.900523 
F-statistic 218.2565     Durbin-Watson stat 2.253605 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix 2.   Factors Explaining Manufacturing Output 
 
At the aggregate level, growth in manufacturing output in Ontario is quite well explained 
by US growth and the deviation of the exchange rate from its purchasing power parity 
value.   It can be seen that the peaks and troughs of the rate of change of Ontario 
manufacturing output growth roughly corresponds with US real GDP growth, but 
manufacturing output is far more volatile. 
 
Figure 7 
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There is a much closer correlation between Ontario manufacturing output and US 
manufacturing, reflecting a close integration of the sectors: 
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Figure 8 
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In the following regression: 
 
DIFQAMFG is the annual percentage change in real value added in Ontario 
manufacturing. 
 
USMFG is the annual percentage change in US manufacturing output. 
 
DPPRAT is the change from the previous year in the ratio of the actual exchange rate to 
its PPP value (from the OECD).  A rising value implies overvaluation.   A distributed lag 
from t(-1) to (t-4) was found to provide the best fit. 
 
The high coefficient on US manufacturing indicates the high degree of integration of 
Ontario with the US economy under the Canada-US FTA. 
 
Experiments with alternative distributed lag structures on the exchange rate found that the 
best fit was obtained by only two lags, t-1 and t-4, which gives the favourable outcome 
that the adjustment to the exchange rate is completed after four years.   If this can be 
relied on, it implies that Ontario is over the worst of the adjustment.  The effect of the 
exchange rate on the rate of change of output has almost completed its adjustment.    
Note that the dependent variable is the rate of change of manufacturing output.  A 
negative rate of change cumulates to a lower level.  This implies a permanent loss in the 
level of output as long as the exchange rate remains at its elevated level.18 
 
                                                 
18
 A high degree of temporal stability was found.  When the regression was estimated over the shorter 
sample from 1985 to 2001, which leaves out the latest upward trend of the exchange rate, the sum of 
coefficients was little changed, at -0.73.  However, the t-stat was also lower, at -2.6. 
 24
The coefficient on US growth is slightly larger than on the exchange rate, but that does 
not tell the whole story in terms of magnitude of impact.  The standard deviation of the 
US growth rate is only 4.5, while the standard deviation of the exchange rate variable was 
6 over the historical sample period.  The implication of the distributed lag formulation is 
that the exchange rate takes about years to be fully passed through, but the bulk of the 
impact is felt within three years. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFQAMFG  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/03/13   Time: 19:41  
Sample: 1985 2011   
Included observations: 27  
      
      Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
      C -1.244734  0.654701 -1.901223 0.0705 
USMFG 0.862068  0.127188 6.777901 0.0000 
PDL01 -0.173666  0.071558 -2.426932 0.0239 
PDL02 0.059116  0.062713 0.942655 0.3561 
PDL03 -0.032336  0.054834 -0.589706 0.5614 
      
      R-squared 0.844206  Mean dependent var 0.892461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.815880  S.D. dependent var 6.074356 
S.E. of regression 2.606457  Akaike info criterion 4.919437 
Sum squared resid 149.4596  Schwarz criterion 5.159407 
Log likelihood -61.41240  Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.990793 
F-statistic 29.80308  Durbin-Watson stat 1.867104 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
      
      
      Lag Distribution 
of DPPPRAT(-1)  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
      
      
 *               .|  0 -0.26512  0.08727 -3.03796 
       *         .|  1 -0.17367  0.07156 -2.42693 
        *        .|  2 -0.14689  0.06559 -2.23955 
      *          .|  3 -0.18478  0.10012 -1.84563 
      
      
 
Sum of 
Lags  -0.77045  0.15938 -4.83417 
      
      
 
 
It is interesting to compare ROC manufacturing with Ontario.  In the following 
regression, everything is the same, except that the dependent variable is the rate of 
change of manufacturing value added in the rest of Canada.  The coefficient on US 
growth is almost the same.    While the ROC provinces export products related to natural 
resources, the demand for these appears to be highly correlated with the US 
manufacturing cycle.   
 
What is remarkably different is the exchange rate, which is just barely statistically 
significant, and has a much lower impact.   This does not change even when a shorter 
sample period is used, leaving out the latest upsurge of the exchange rate.   The sum of 
coefficients on the exchange rate distributed lag is -0.77 for Ontario, compared to only  
-0.27 for ROC. 
 
This probably reflects the greater reliance of the rest of Canada on exports of natural 
resource commodities, whose prices are set internationally in US dollars, and tend to be 
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correlated with the exchange rate.   Much of what is classed as manufacturing in those 
provinces consists of processing of those commodities, or providing inputs into the 
commodity production.   Strong commodity prices encourage natural resource production 
in those provinces, and resource-related manufacturing activities.   If certain inputs and 
equipment need to be customized, there is an advantage to being close to the customer, 
and it would make the demand relatively impervious to the exchange rate. 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DIFQAMFGROC  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/30/12   Time: 12:24  
Sample: 1985 2011   
Included observations: 27  
      
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
C 0.207272  0.689373 0.300667 0.7665 
USMFG 0.715764  0.133924 5.344565 0.0000 
PDL01 -0.095323  0.075347 -1.265110 0.2191 
PDL02 -0.086962  0.066034 -1.316926 0.2014 
PDL03 0.046494  0.057738 0.805259 0.4293 
      
R-squared 0.691579  Mean dependent var 2.208898 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635503  S.D. dependent var 4.545843 
S.E. of regression 2.744490  Akaike info criterion 5.022643 
Sum squared resid 165.7089  Schwarz criterion 5.262613 
Log likelihood -62.80568  Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.093999 
F-statistic 12.33278  Durbin-Watson stat 1.537357 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000021     
      
      Lag Distribution 
of DPPPRAT(-1)  i 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic 
      
             .   *|  0  0.03813  0.09189  0.41498 
     *       .    |  1 -0.09532  0.07535 -1.26511 
 *           .    |  2 -0.13579  0.06906 -1.96626 
      *      .    |  3 -0.08327  0.10542 -0.78992 
      
 
Sum of 
Lags  -0.27625  0.16782 -1.64617 
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Appendix 3.  Analysis of Productivity Growth in Wholesale and Retail Trade 
 
As was noted above in the discussion of Table 6, productivity growth in the distribution 
services provided by wholesalers and retailers increased considerably more in the ROC 
than in Ontario over the last several years. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis below, retail and wholesale trade have been combined 
into one sector.   In Statistics Canada's definition, "wholesale" includes many big box 
stores selling to the public.  The historical distinction between wholesale and retail has 
largely vanished. 
 
Intuitively, one would expect that productivity in this sector is quite cyclical.    Stores can 
vary the number of staff they have on hand to some extent, depending on the amount of 
volume.  However, even when customers are few and far between, they have to keep a 
certain minimum number of staff in each store.  Therefore, in periods of slack, sales 
clerks will be standing around not making many sales.   Productivity in terms of service 
provided per hour of work will be relatively low.  The strong cyclical association 
between this sector's productivity growth and consumer spending is seen in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 
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Source:   Productivity Accounts and Provincial Economic Accounts.  
 
 
The spending variable in Figure 9 is real consumer spending on goods (that is, total 
consumer spending minus spending on services).   
 
This relationship was used in a regression equation, pooling data for both Ontario and the 
ROC.  A strong and statistically significant relationship was found, with productivity 
rising about 0.86 percent for each percentage increase consumer spending. 
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Dependent Variable: PROD  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Date: 01/03/13   Time: 19:36  
Sample: 1985 2011   
Periods included: 27   
Cross-sections included: 2  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 54 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -0.149123 0.493590 -0.302118 0.7638 
SPEND 0.860094 0.144990 5.932093 0.0000 
     
R-squared 0.403599     Mean dependent var 2.079074 
Adjusted R-squared 0.392130     S.D. dependent var 3.018173 
S.E. of regression 2.353149     Akaike info criterion 4.585720 
Sum squared resid 287.9402     Schwarz criterion 4.659386 
Log likelihood -121.8144     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.614130 
F-statistic 35.18972     Durbin-Watson stat 2.073680 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
